I must confess that I too have a bit of a problem with the aims of the so-called Thousand-Year Reich being characterized as "somewhat less than worthy". What kind of nonsense is that? Are we to understand that the murder of millions of Jews, Poles and Gypsies was somehow MITIGATED by the fact that Hitler built a great highway system?

I don’t think that we should refuse to accept that Rommel was a gifted general, just because he exercised those gifts on behalf of an odious regime. Tielhard’s challenge was not to suggest generals whom we necessarily approve of, but generals who were good at doing what generals do.

Those criteria also need defining as part of the challenge. I suggest that successful generals motivate, organize and fight their troops more effectively and in more innovative ways than other generals.

Erwin Rommel might have been my candidate, for all the reasons already advocated. But as he is “taken” I will put forward another. As it happens, my candidate is one who might find some favour with snm and Coolupway. He was described by Moshe Dayan, who knew a thing or two about the job, as “a military genius and a wonderful man”. Had he lived it has been suggested that despite his not being Jewish he might have been offered a senior position in the IDF by Ben Gurion.

Orde Wingate only just qualifies as a general, since he was tragically killed in an air accident at the age of 41 having reached the rank of Major General. Nevertheless, despite a relatively short career as a general he had qualities that make him a good candidate here. He pioneered the use of air support of long range ground actions which modern armies now rely upon. He recognized the potency of forces that were both well motivated and well trained, and the relative uselessness of those that were not. From his military beginnings catching bandits in Sudan, to his death in 1944 by which time he was operating an army 12,000 strong hundreds of miles behind enemy lines in the jungles of Burma, his genius was always to succeed by doing something different and unexpected.

An eccentric and sometimes an uncomfortably intense man, he was intolerant of staff officers, fiercely loyal to his fighting troops, and conducted a personal battle with clinical depression (which he also won). He was summed up by Winston Churchill like this: “We had not talked for half an hour before I felt myself in the presence of a man of the highest quality. It was his genius of leadership which inspired all who served under him. Here indeed is a name which deserves lasting honour.”

I took the quotes above from this site which has an extensive biography. http://members.aol.com/ordewingate/menu.html

Quote:

---

I don’t think that we should refuse to accept that Rommel was a gifted general, just because he exercised those gifts on behalf of an odious regime. Tielhard’s challenge was not to suggest generals whom we necessarily approve of, but generals who were good at doing what generals do.

---

I ask once again: are we speaking about great tacticians or are we talking about great generals?

There's no denying that Rommel was a brilliant tactician, but I still maintain that a general is much more than just a tactician and a fighter. A great general has to be much, much more than that.

If we're taking about great tacticians, someone please let me know: I have little interest in such a discussion and will bow out of the thread. But if we're talking about more than just tactics, then the moral issue must have a place in the discussion. Otherwise we're just talking about tacticians who happened to have the rank of general.

***

Some consider Wingate the "father of modern guerrilla warfare". In Israel today his name is mostly associated with sports, since the national sports institute is named after him.

I extend my sincere thanks to the barrister. I have learned a great deal and am indeed duly impressed.

Cool, if the barrister you appreciate is me, then technically I am a solicitor rather than a barrister (we have two main types of attorney in England), but thank you.

I agree with snm that a great general has to have great qualities, but of generalship. Aside from having a grasp of tactics that enables him to cope with the unexpected - and generate the unexpected for his opponents - he has to understand how (and have the personality) to get the best from his available troops and equipment, and get both where they are needed to implement his tactics.

I don't agree necessarily though that a great general has to have qualities of greatness in other callings as well. Possibly because I come from a different political tradition, I tend to think it is dangerous for military people to turn their hand to other things, especially politics.

1) Wingate

Oh Boy! What do I say Stew ? Thank you for supporting my position on Rommel’s eligibility and the need for clear criteria but er … Orde Wingate? Once again we are regrettably back in the (somewhat*) less than Holy Land with all of its troubles. To my mind Wingate’s work in Palestine clearly makes him a gifted and talented Terrorist! He (along with Mike Collins) is at least in part the reason for the way the IDF operates in the way it does today. However I shall not fall into the same trap as snm. Just because I don’t like what he did, it does not mean he should be removed from consideration.

The reasons that I do think he should be removed from consideration as the Greatest General of Century Twenty are as follows.

Wingate achieved a great deal but I think there are three telling points against him. The first you have already hinted at Stew. Because of his relatively junior rank he never had the opportunity to run an independent strategic campaign. His large scale actions although fought independently were only elements in someone else’s strategies. He may have performed brilliantly in higher command, who knows, he simply never had the chance.

Second, the type of action he advocated in which large Deep Penetration columns are supported by air is effective however it is only available to armies which can obtain air superiority for at least long enough to drop the supplies. Inherent in this idea is the implication that one is fighting for the army with the greatest resources. The army with greatest resources usually wins irrespective of clever or novel tactics.

Lastly, even though the Deep Penetration concept was never fully exploited, largely because of Wingate’s death there is no evidence to suggest it can of itself win a war. A conventional army is still required for that.

2) Rommel

snm, the term ‘somewhat’ was first used in your post in a manner I felt disingenuous I simply echoed the word in my own post.

Having defended Rommel’s right to be considered I find myself unconvinced by his case.

3) Eisenhower

fjohn, it did occur to me that Eisenhower had all of the advantages:

A secure industrial base (US and Canada)
An (almost) secure marshalling area (UK)
Air superiority
Naval superiority
Intelligence superiority
Security from Partisan actions
Fresh troops and troops in greater numbers
An ally in the East doing most of the damage to the enemy (ca. 3 German Divisions Lost to Soviets to each one lost to the Western Allies).

I was not quite sure where the quality of his generalship was relevant to the outcome of the European theatre WWII?

Then it occurred to me that in the Russian Civil War/Counter Revolution Leon Trotsky fulfilled a function very similar to that which Eisenhower fulfilled in WWII. Trotsky had none of the advantages which I list above and very few resources yet he too achieved victory for his cause. Surely then if Eisenhower is a great general then Trotsky must be a far greater one?

*see Rommel

So, you have a problem with Wingate's contributions to Israeli fighting doctrines, but no problem with Rommel's having taken orders from Hitler while Hitler was busy implementing The Final Solution.

Got it.

Please read what I have written snm, not what you think I have written.

Tielhard, I have read enough of your posts on other threads to appreciate how strongly you dislike everything to do with Israel and Zionism and I don't want to be drawn into that.

The thread can decide if Wingate has a good claim. I acknowledge that his track record of generalship was short (albeit full of promise) and agree this is a weakness in his claim that might cost him the position of "greatest".

However, I don't necessarily agree with all of your other points against him. The strategy he pursued in Burma was of his own devising and he had to badger his superiors to permit him to take it forward. Only by continuing to enjoy success against the Japanese in a theatre where other British generals had failed could he generate enough "clout" to be allowed to risk thousands of troops on previously untried ventures.

I agree that air-supplied columns deep in enemy held territory need some measure of air superiority to survive, but it was not the case that the British-led forces in Burma had greater resources than the Japanese forces they opposed. The Japanese had been advancing steadily towards India with every indication that they would take it when they got there. Some argue that the damage Wingate's forces had inflicted on the Japanese was decisive in enabling the conventional forces to stem that tide, and that had his strategy not lost momentum with his death Wingate's columns could have broken the Japanese by their own efforts alone.

Stew,

Just one point I would like to clarify. “I have read enough of your posts on other threads to appreciate how strongly you dislike everything to do with Israel and Zionism.” I do not dislike Israel. I would describe my position on Israeli-Palestinian relations as robustly neutral.

Tielhard, I think some posts on other threads have given readers what must therefore be a misleading impression that you hold a somewhat greater degree of animosity than that, hence my observation. Fortunately, you have been able to correct my misapprehension, and in this thread the issue is something of an aside anyway.

Tielhard's many many posts on other threads about Israelis being Nazis, etc., mistakenly left some people with the impression that he has an unfavourable attitude towards Israel. Fortunately, the goings-on in this thread have managed to clear this misapprehension: if Nazism was only "somewhat" unworthy, then calling Israelis "Nazi terrorists" is practically a compliment.

Enough Ladies and Gentlemen, can we get back to the thread and keep your comments to specifics rather than generalisations (Sorry that was an unintended pun!). At least one poster will not be returning. Lets not have any more enforsed departures please!
(Personal abuse is not tolerated on the site - please read the forum guidelines).
Ok you didn't like Rommel for whatever reason, how does Ord Wingate (yes I know he was a Major-General) measure up with his Burma Campaign?

It's strange that the century that witnessed the two World Wars and many, many other wars seems to have produced no unambiguously outstanding general. Perhaps by 1914 war had become such a complicated affair, that the conduct of war was more a matter of teamwork behind the scenes - planning at General Staff level, harnessing the economy to the war effort, propanganda - that there was less scope for brilliance on the battlefield itself? What do people think?

General Flagstaff because he was smart enough to hire Ms. Buxley.

Here's one for the Aussies - General Sir John Monash. He was educated as an engineer and a lawyer. Monash University in Melbourne is named after him.

He led the Australian Imperial Forces during WW1 from Gallipoli through to the Western Front. As leader of the Australian forces in Europe he helped bring an end to the March German Offensive. His leadership of the Australian and American contingent that captured Hamel helped turn the tide of the war and led to a string of successes by Australian troops.

He was the driving force behind the use of different types of weaponry and forces in combined assaults, a general tactic which has been expanded upon right through until the present. His tactical thinking was also exceptional. He defied the wishes of the British commanders of the war, believing their tactics and particularly their use of infantry to be outdated and counter-productive.

He was knighted after the Battle of Amiens which saw one of the most blatant examples of the success of Sir John's tactical style. It signified a move away from trench warfare towards more multi-faceted attacks involving much more mobile units.

While all this came at heavy losses, Sir John was a leader who ensured that his men were kept informed and motivated while still maintaining the discipline essential to this type of warfare.

He was undoubtedly a key player in the success against Germany in the war.

Edited to add - At the end of the war he became Director-General of Repatriation. His attention to detail and his administrative abilities, already evident from him successes in the war, allowed him to demonstrate the care he felt for those who had so recently been under his command and who sacrificed a great deal upon his orders.

Following the war he filled civilian posts, including one as head of the Victorian State Electricity Commission. He also maintained an active involvement in community organisations such as the Boy Scouts and in organising the recognition of ANZAC Day in Australia (a public holiday dedicated to the remembrance of our war dead and the celebration of the accomplishments and sacrifices of veterans).

Field Marshall Montgomery wrote of him, "I would name Sir John Monash as the best general on the western front in Europe."

I remember reading of him years ago, but most of this has been cobbled together from: http://www.awm.gov.au/1918/people/genmonash.htm

A quote from Sir John: " It was all over on ninety-three minutes - the perfection of teamwork" on the Battle of Hamel on 4 July 1917.

In my view he was a consummate general: a leader, a motivator, a tactician, a man of ingenuity, a victor, a gentleman and a scholar.

Thanks for suggesting Monash.

I've a hunch that one should turn to an area or kind of warfare that came into its own in the C20, and that why I have much sympathy with the nomination of Wingate.

However, it so happens that my own suggestion relates to a commander in a kind of warfare that didn't exist at all before the C20. Hugh Dowding (1882-1970) was an Air Marshall, not a general. His key achievements are of the utmost significance.

1. In 1930 he was appointed head of what later became the R&D section of the RAF. In this position he worked hard for the development of an effective system of air defence - at the very time when politicians were at best skeptical, at worst defeatist. ("The bomber will always get through", said Baldwin in 1932!!)

2. Dowding pressed successfully for the development of fast, highly manoeuvrable fighters and from 1933 encouraged the development of what later became the Hurricane and the Spitfire.

3. He also pressed, from 1934-35, for the development of an effective and integrated early warning system - radar. (He also encouraged early experimental work on infra-red location and distancing).

4.From 1937-41 Dowding was C-in-C of RAF Fighter Command, and in 1940 commanded the RAF fighters during the Battle of Britain.

This victory not only forced the Nazis to abandon plans to invade Britain. It had far-reaching, positive consequences for the further course and ultimate outcome of WWII ... Need I say more?

Quote:

---

Perhaps by 1914 war had become such a complicated affair, that the conduct of war was more a matter of teamwork behind the scenes - planning at General Staff level, harnessing the economy to the war effort, propaganda - that there was less scope for brilliance on the battlefield itself?

---

The more I think about that the more correct it sounds. The fact is that in the twentieth century, more than in any previous century, the credit for victory in a war belongs to a country's civilian leaders almost as much as it belongs to the military leaders.

I think the greatest would have to be General Zhukov, who was a Soviet general in WWII. Zhukov invented new anti-armor tactics that proved to be quite successful against Germany's new style of mechanized warfare, and it is arguable that his leadership was instrumental in the allied victory in WWII.

1) Uroborus

I have thought about it and I am sorry Uroborus I just cannot swallow Georgi Konstantinovich Zhukov as the Greatest General of Century Twenty.

He started as a soldier in WWI then fought for the Red Army in the Civil War/Counter Revolution during which he rose through the ranks to command a regiment. Somehow he survived the purges of the 1930s. His greatest success may well have been as commander of the 1939 Soviet campaign against the Japanese invasion of Outer Mongolia before WWII began. So badly did his army defeat the Japanese that they signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. Japan never attacked the Soviet rear from their bases in Manchuria during WWII. Even here, fighting the Japanese of all people, he was considered profligate of troops.

In WWII proper he performed very well in the dark days of the Soviet retreat and contributed at Moscow, on the Leningrad front and on the Volga. He also managed to deal with Stalin better than most. My real problems with Zhukov become obvious when he was on the offensive. First, he was simply far too wasteful of his troops and this loss of manpower was a significant contributor to the USSR being unable to keep up with the West after the war. Second he (and Stalin) missed an early opportunity to move on Berlin, shorten the war and completely screw the Western Allies.

He also have appears to have been quite vain in the sense that his Uncle Joe was easily able to play him and 1 Belorussian off against Koniev and 1 Ukranian. Having said this he seems to have had a better idea of how an enemy must understand defeat and a war should end than any other commander on either side. His final assault on Berlin was more theatre that war. A sustained operatic climax written in blood, when the Red Flag flew above Berlin the Germans knew they were defeated in a way they never understood when the surrendered to Montgomery. So a significant figure in World history absolutely, Greatest General, no.

2) bloomsby

I rather like Dowding for the post. However, having thought about it a bit the case doesn’t really hold up. Each of the points you make are true but I suggest not enough. Dowding made a good stab at technically preparing the RAF for war. His was a far from a perfect preparation though, the RAF could have been flying fast jets in 1940. He fought the Battle of Britain in what was widely regarded as an excessively defensive manner. Many would say that the battle was lost by the Germans rather than won by the British after the Luftwaffe stopped targeting fighter airfields. After he and Keith Park were sacked in favour of more aggressive officers he never held another combat post.

Just wondering why such names as Heinz W. Guderian, William F. Halsey, Chester W. Nimitz, Hugh Montague Trenchard have not popped up yet.
By what standards do you judge "military greatness"? A British friend of mine with quite a bit of military experience calls Brian Horrocks his "favourite" general. Because Horrocks was "a general of the soldiers".
Same friend calls Napoleon a "military disaster" because in the end Napoleon's most sensational campaigns always failed (Russia; Waterloo).
What does "greatest" mean when you talk about generals? The most glamorous? The most humane? The most murderous?
And don't certain "romantic" details make some generals greater than they really are? Patton's sense of rhetoric, Moshe Dayan's eye-patch?
Was General de Gaulle a lesser general because his country was on the losing side?
Is it the press and the media that make generals such as Norman Schwarzkopf into stars?
Anyone who can formulate any basic rules to judge a general?

I agree that Zhukov and Dowding don't quite make it - for the reasons given.

As for broad criteria for assessing great generals, I see that Hutchinson's Dictionary of Battles by Ian V. Hogg, Brockhampton Press, London 1997 (1st published in 1995) suggests (p. 188) three pre-requisites. Paraphrased, they are as follows:

1. A great general must be successful in a number of battles or a major campaign.

2. He must be adept at different kinds of warfare - "attacks, defences, retreats and sieges' (p.188)

3. He must be a field commander: he must "exercise his command in battle". (p.188) This last also means that he must be in effective control on the battlefield, prevent his senior subordinates from quarrelling, following their own plans and so on.

I'd add that he must also maintain good order and discipline off the battle-field too. Plunder, rape, arson and the like after or before a battle reflects very badly on any commander.

The book goes on to concede that very few generals match up to all three criteria.

As far as the C20 is concerned, there's the point I made earlier, which was then expressed more fully and elegantly by snm that in that century there was a vast increase in the sheer complexity of warfare as well as a blurring of the distinction between the military and civilian, at all levels including the very highest.

I note with interest that one of the post-Napoleonic generals that Hutchinson's Dictionary of Battles singles for very high praise is Helmuth Moltke (Senior, 1800-91) - partly of course, for his victories in the wars against Austria (1866) and France (1870-71), but above all for his work as Chief of the Prussian General Staff from 1858 ff. .

In other words, the immense significance of long-term planning goes back into the C19 ...

Eisenhower- he did benefit from several advantages, but those advantages were won, they were not inherent. The Luftwafte far exceeded the Allied planes in number when the war began but lost the air battles, thus the Allies obtained air superiority that was crucial to success in the ETO. The Wehrmacht had only to transport supplies and replacement troops a few hundred kilometers or less while Eisenhower had his reinforcement of men and supplies traveling thousands of kilometers over air, land, and sea - a daunting task at best. The American army was paltry when she entered the war and had to build and train a fighting force to repel a highly trained and disciplined German army. Hardly an advantage for Eisenhower. However, in my opinion, Ike was too far removed from the realities of the front and what his men were going through. While I think he had a good grasp of the "big picture" and what was needed to defeat the Nazis, his refusal to look at the necessity of individual battles caused a high price to be paid. Often battles were waged with high casualties for little or no advancement and certainly to no tactical advantage.

Patton - he had one philosophy: ATTACK! ATTACK! ATTACK! While largely successful, he too waged unnecessary battles at the cost of numerous lives just because he refused to adjust his philosophy to the situation at hand. I am hard pressed to find another criticism of him - except that he was a pr*@*, but most generals were.

Montgomery - devised too many failed battle plans but would look for justifications to call them successful. His relationship with Ike was borderline insubordinate and he was more interested in increasing his authority and command than ensuring a cohesive Allied fighting force.

Rommel - I think he fought both for Germany and The Third Reich. It is clear that he was smart enough to eventually realize that the war was a lost cause led by a criminally insane fuhrer, but he continued to lead a fight that he knew was not in the best interest of his country.

With the Eleventh of November in view: is there an explanation why no general from First World War - not even John J. Pershing - seems to have caught your eye as a nominee for "greatness"?

Well, Monash did get a mention and he was a WWI general. However, WWI is notorious for bad generals.