Special Sub-Topic: Japan and the Early War Years Click Here To Play: Japan and the Early War Years

The Japanese believed in the divine origins of their land. Ruled by a god-emperor, the Tenno, it was a land watched over by the lesser gods and inhabited by a semi-divine chosen people. They saw death in the service of the Tenno as insufficient atonement for the debt they owed their homeland and regarded themselves as being charged with a divine mission. What was their manifest destiny?

The domination and leadership of eastern Asia. In the 1930's, as Japan sought to assume the leadership and control of eastern Asia by starting with the conquest of China, it became increasingly obvious that not many people outside of Japan shared her view of her 'heaven sent' mandate.

The territories in eastern Asia contained all the raw materials that Japan would need to become self-sufficient and not be dependent on the white nations for her means of existence. Rubber and tin from Malaya, iron ore from the Philippines, rice from Indo-China, and oil, bauxite, coal, etc from the Indies. The events of 15 May 1940 brought within Japan's grasp the glittering prospect of securing these territories and their resources. What was the event?

German armour ruptured French positions overlooking the Meuse. On the outbreak of war, Japan had declared her neutrality. She had little to gain and much to lose from an Anglo-French victory, but this possibility was ended by the events of 15 May 1940. When German armour ruptured the French positions overlooking the Meuse, it made a breach that the Anglo-French armies were unable to seal. Within six weeks France and the British Expeditionary Force in France were hounded to decisive defeat. This created an entirely new situation in the Far East, which Japan immediately prepared to take advantage of.

Up until May 1940 the army had restrained the navy's desire for movement toward Southeast Asia. It had no wish to add further complications to an unfinished war and the sensitive uncertainties of Japanese-Soviet relations. With the defeat of France the army saw its chance to isolate China from outside support. What was the primary action to come out of the army-navy liaison meetings in June and July 1940?

Replacement of the Japanese Government. The two services joined together to force the resignation of the cautious government of Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai when it showed signs of being alarmed by the implications of their demands.

Who was appointed to replace Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai in the new war cabinet?

Prince Fumimaro Konoye. The services only allowed Konoye to take office if he agreed to an alliance with Germany and Italy, a strengthening of the armed forces, and a more aggressive strategy in Southeast Asia.

With the fall of France, something close to real panic gripped the United States. Congress passed a series of measures designed to strengthen the American armed services, the most significant measure being the Two-Ocean Naval Expansion Act. The Imperial Navy appreciated that when the act's provisions were realized, the Americans would be so powerful at sea as to be unchallengable. When did Japan believe she would stand at the peak of her strength against the Americans?

Late 1941 to early 1942. The key factor in this situation was time. The act would only produce ships from 1943 onward, and was not due for completion until the period of 1946-48. As Japan had entered the field of naval rearmament early, her 1937 and 1939 programs would allow her to stand at the peak of her strength relative to the Americans in late 1941 or early 1942. Thus certainly for a year, and maybe two, the Imperial Navy would either be superior or very close to American strength in the Pacific.

Japan's strategy was the responsibility of the Imperial Government and the Naval General Staff but in fact one man came to dominate the strategic planning of the Imperial Navy in the two years before the Pearl Harbor operation. Who was it?

Admiral Isoruku Yamamoto. Yamamoto was a practical, realistic patriot. He shared Japanese ambitions in the Far East, but he knew from first hand experience, gained as a student at Harvard and later as a naval attache in Washington, of the awesome power and potential of American industry. He was outspoken in his opposition to a war with the Americans because he had no confidence in the ultimate outcome of the conflict. He was trapped by the drift toward war, and he believed that war might be forced upon Japan if she was to retain her world position and self-respect. Increasingly, he became convinced that if a war was inevitable than it was desirable that it be induced and not delayed.

In the initial planning stages with Captain Genda, why did Admiral Yamamoto think that strikes on American battleships would be more effective than strikes on aircraft carriers?

It would be more psychologically devastating. Genda thought that this was nonsense. Either carriers were the decisive strike weapon at sea or they were not. If they were, then there could be no justification for using them against lesser weapons or secondary objectives. Genda firmly fixed attention on the main objective of the attack - the elimination of the American aircraft carriers.

The technical problems involved in the plan to attack Pearl Harbour were formidable, but most of them were soluble. Most of the problems centred around the torpedo, accepted by Genda as the primary means of attack. Japanese aerial torpedoes were designed to be dropped at about 250 feet and a speed of 150 knots before plunging to 14 fathoms. Unfortunately Pearl Harbor was only 8 fathoms deep. What was the main thing they did to solve this problem?

Fitting wooden fins to the torpedo. Clearly there were problems as Pearl Harbor only drew eight fathoms and conventional torpedoes would run harmlessly into the bed of the harbor unless they were modified.It was not until September that tests were concluded and production started on torpedoes equipped with wooden fins which seemed capable of keeping the weapon shallow-running. Even then, only an 80 percent efficiency rating was given to these weapons.

At an early stage in the planning Yamamoto selected an area in southern Kyushu as the training area for aircrews. The bay, with its restricted waters, volcanic island, and waterside buildings, bore a strong resemblance to Pearl Harbor. It was selected for precisely that reason. What was the name of this area?

Kagoshima Bay. The bomber crews exercised over Kagoshima Bay for weeks. The torpedo bombers, perhaps the most vulnerable of the attacking aircraft, were subjected to approach runs through the buildings of Kagoshima before a flight at 50 to 70 feet above the waters of the bay. The dive bombers had their release points lowered from 2000 to 1500 feet to increase the prospect of a hit while the high level bombers were intensively trained. To offset the weakness of equipment the Japanese had to rely on experience and instinct on the part of the aircrew. It is no exaggeration to assert that the Japanese carrier pilots committed to the raid on Pearl Harbor represented the best trained aircrews in the world at that time.

On the 25th November Yamamoto, anticipating the failure of last-gasp diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful settlement with the Americans, ordered the carrier task force to sail on its mission the following day. The six carriers that sailed are well known, but which two battleships sailed with the fleet?

Hiei and Kirishima. In dense fog the carrier force slipped out of its desolate anchorage in the Kuriles on the 26th, the last of the carriers clearing Tankan Bay at about 0900 hours. The task force steamed eastward, following the 43rd parallel, into the stormy northern Pacific. On the 2 December the task force received the coded message "Niitaka yama nobore", which was the signal that Japan had finally decided upon war and that Nagano was to proceed with the operation as planned.