Panzer Divisions In France: Myths and Realities Quiz

Answer: 11 divisions

On 1 June 1944, the German High Command had a total of 11 panzer and panzergrenadier divisions stationed in France, Belgium and Netherlands. They were:
1. SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 2. SS Panzer Division Das Reich, 12. SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, 17. SS Panzergrenadier Division Götz von Berlichingen, 2., 9., 11., 19., 21., 116. Panzer Divisions, Panzer Lehr Division.

Answer: 6 divisions

Six heavily damaged panzer and panzergrenadier divisions were withdrawn from the Eastern Front in the Ukraine to the Western Europe between March-May 1944, in the aftermath of the Red Army's gigantic Dnieper-Carpathian Operation. These units were:
1. SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler, 2. SS Panzer Division Das Reich, 9., 11., 19., 116. Panzer Divisions. As a result, 6 out of 11 German panzer and panzergrenadier divisions stationed in Western Europe on 1 June 1944 were actually formations that only recently arrived there after being badly mauled on the Eastern Front.

Answer: The Germans transferred an entire SS Panzer Corps from France before the Allied invasion

In March 1944, a major crisis hit German forces on the Eastern Front in the Ukraine. There, during the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Operation, an entire 1. Panzerarmee was encircled in what is known as the Kamenets-Podolsky Pocket. The German forces were on the verge of suffering even greater disaster than that at Stalingrad. Erich von Manstein had persuaded Hitler that a powerful reinforcement must be sent to rescue the encircled army.

As reinforcements, Hitler provided the entire II. SS Panzer Korps (9. and 10. SS Panzer Divisionen) from France, commanded by SS Obergruppenführer Paul Hauser.

The transfer of this unit from France with just several months left before the Allied invasion of France was particularly painful for Hitler and the German High Command.

It jeopardized the strategy laid down in Fuehrer Directive 51 in November 1943 and carefully nurtured through the winter, just when the Allied invasion seemed most likely to come. In the spring of 1944, however, the dramatic developments on the Eastern Front, forced Hitler to yield to Manstein's demands and send corps right across the continent.

The loss of this unit and several other smaller independent armored units meant that German forces in France were deprived of over 360 tanks and assault guns at the start of Allied D-Day landings on 6 June 1944.

Answer: 3. SS Panzer Division Totenkopf

The 3. SS Panzer Division Totenkopf was never employed in Normandy. When a new major crisis erupted on the German Eastern Front with the destruction of Army Group Center during the Soviet Operation Bagration, the division was dispatched to the central sector of the front there.

Answer: 4 divisions

Of the 11 panzer and panzergrenadier divisions stationed in the West on 6 June 1944, only 4 divisions were fully operational. These were the 2., 21. Panzer Divisions, Panzer Lehr Division and 12. SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. All of the rest were at best only partially operational. This was due to the fact that nearly all other panzer divisions had only recently arrived in the West, after being badly damaged on the Eastern Front during the Dnieper-Carpathian Operation. For example, the elite 1. SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler at the time of its withdrawal from the Ukraine in April 1944 had less than 9,000 personnel, or under 50% out of an authorized strength of 20,000. The equipment losses were even worse. The division returned back to the Ukraine from Italy in November 1943 with a formidable amount of armored vehicles- it had 95 Panzer IVs, 96 Panthers, 27 Tigers and 46 StuG's, for an impressive total of 264 tanks and assault guns.

By April 1944, the division had only 11 tanks and assault guns left, few motor vehicles were left too. Thus, the badly depleted division required thorough refitting and later that month it was transferred West. The late arrival of the division to the West meant that at the time of Allied invasion it had major deficiencies, particularly in terms of equipment. For example, on 1 June 1944, the division had only 43% of its authorized tanks and a mere 28% of motor vehicles. Similar cases can be observed with other panzer divisions.

Answer: The transfer of large amounts of equipment to the Eastern Front

The extraordinarily high German equipment losses sustained during the Soviet Dnieper-Carpathian Operation in the Western Ukraine, particularly the March-April 1944 period, had a major effect on the German equipment allocation. The German High Command expected that the Red Army's main summer offensive of 1944 would either be directed towards Poland, the gateway to Germany, or deeper into Romania, to seize Germany's primary source of oil, or perhaps both. Therefore, the speedy restoration of the German formations, panzer divisions foremost, deployed in those areas was a matter of urgent necessity.

Consequently, the equipment deliveries to the Eastern Front far surpassed those to the West. From April to June 1944, the Eastern Front was allocated 2,605 tanks, assault guns, self-propelled anti-tank and artillery pieces, compared to 1,593 allocated to the West. Similarly, during this period the Eastern Front was allocated 45,266 motor vehicles of all types, while West was given only 20,129 motor vehicles. With most of the new German equipment having been dispatched to the East over the preceding months, deficiencies among the panzer divisions stationed in the West could only be rectified at a slow pace. In consequence, in early June 1944, 7 of the 11 available panzer and panzergrenadier divisions in the West were still not fully operational.

Answer: Panzer Lehr Division

At the time of Allied Normandy landings, the Panzer Lehr Division was one of the best equipped German panzer divisions during the whole war. On 1 June 1944, the division had 99 Panzer IVs, 89 Panthers, 8 Tigers (5 of them Tiger IIs), 31 Jagdpanzer TV's self-propelled tank destroyers, 10 StuG Assault Guns, for an impressive total of 237 armored vehicles. Of course not all of these armored vehicles were used at once, many arrived only gradually, some did not arrive at all.

The division was unique in other way too. Unlike most other panzer divisions that used trucks, the Panzer Lehr Division had all of its panzergrenadier bataillone mounted on Schützenpanzerwagen or armored half-tracks.

The division was almost fully motorized, having 92% of its authorized motor vehicles. Together with a few other panzer divisions, this division and its state was a sharp contrast to most of the panzer divisions stationed in the West, which had major deficiencies, especially in terms of motor transport. Almost from the start of the invasion, the division was embroiled in heavy fighting.

Answer: Yes

Most of the panzer divisions in the West were not committed to Normandy right after the Allied D-Day landings on 6 June 1944. The primary reason for this is the fact that most of them had major deficiencies in equipment, especially in motor vehicles. These deficiencies affected unit training, and severely limited the firepower and especially the mobility of panzer divisions whose strength rested upon their ability to hit hard and fast. Another key reason was the fact that many of the panzer divisions in the West were formations badly depleted after sustained combat on the Eastern Front. This meant that the replacements fed into these units needed training and since important units had arrived during the spring 1944, they were not yet fully trained when the Allies invaded.

So, for example, the 17. SS Panzergrenadier Division was ordered to move to Normandy on 7 June. The division still arrived slowly. The lack of trucks meant that 2 of its 6 panzergrenadier battalions had to use bicycles for transport and was not fully assembled until late June. Even then, the division's engineer battalion and most of its anti-tank battalions only entered combat between mid-July to early August 1944. Similarly, the shortages of trucks in the 2. SS Panzer Division meant that the division did not arrive fully at the front until late July 1944. The first units of the 1. SS Panzer Division arrived to Normandy in late June, but even this was only a two-battalion battle group. Most of the division only began its assembly south of Caen only on 6 July. Many elements remained behind at its initial deployment area in Belgium because they had still not received their required weapons and vehicles. The 9. and 116. Panzer Divisions, experiencing shortages in equipment and needing more time to train, did not arrive to Normandy until early August.

Only those divisions that were fully operational were used almost immediately, namely the 2., 21. Panzer Divisions, Panzer Lehr Division and 12. SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, which arrived to the front between 7-12 June 1944.

Answer: Panzer IV

Often it is written about the superiority of German tanks, particularly the vaunted Panthers and Tigers, over the Allied tanks. While this is true, these tanks were not the most numerous German tanks in Normandy. The most widespread German tank was the older Panzer IV and it can be hardly said to be superior over the Allied tanks.

In fact, in terms of mobility and mechanical reliability, the Allied Sherman tank was superior to Panzer IV. One major advantage the German tank held was in the main armament, which was more powerful than the 75mm gun of the Sherman - with the L48-gun, it had much better penetration capabilities than the Sherman with 75 mm gun (except for Sherman with 76mm gun). Protection and mobility though was slightly inferior to the Sherman tank. Altogether, the panzer divisions that fought in Normandy brought 841 Panzer IVs to the battlefield.

Answer: Panzer divisions were significantly weakened, but not destroyed

It often said in the popular literature, especially those that are over 20 years old, that panzer divisions were almost completely wiped out after the Normandy campaign. To major extent this false notion has persisted to this day. However, contemporary scholarship clearly shows that it is not true. For starters, large portions of German forces did manage to break out of the Falaise Pocket, thanks to the counter-attack from the outside by panzer divisions. Granted, the encirclement and the breakout did result in significant manpower and especially equipment losses, but panzer divisions still remained a fighting force.

So, for example one author in the past has used a preliminary German report about the state of panzer divisions after the Falaise Pocket. As contemporary scholarship has shown, authors in the past have often used German reports without fully understanding their content. For example, it was claimed that the 12. SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend had a mere 300 men left after the Falaise Pocket, compared to its strength of 20,540 men at the start of Allied invasion. However, this evaluation is fundamentally flawed, because the number of soldiers given in the document actually refer to just the number of riflemen, not the total manpower strength of the division, which includes panzer crews, mortar teams, artillerymen, anti-tank gunners, supply elements, rear service personnel, divisional staff etc. Thus, the 12. SS Panzer-Division Hitlerjugend had altogether more than 12,000 men after the Falaise Pocket, not 300, which is a considerable difference. In the past it was also claimed that only 1 man out of every 3 of the 2. SS Panzer Division Das Reich escaped from Normandy. The division numbered 18,108 men at the start of Allied invasion. After the Normandy campaign, the division reported to have 12,357 men. Thus, it is clear that, at most, 1 man in 3 did not escape from Normandy in relatively good physical health. The Panzer Lehr Division had 14,699 men at the start of Allied invasion. During the Normandy campaign and the Falaise Pocket, the division sustained 7,411 casualties, or 50% losses in personnel. However, during the campaign 3,437 replacements and convalescents arrived at the division, meaning that the division altogether numbered over 10,000 men after the Normandy campaign. Out of over 200+ armored vehicles that the division had at the start of the campaign, only 20 were left by the end of it, but over 20 new tanks were in transit.

Therefore, it is clear that German panzer divisions were significantly weakened after the Normandy campaign, especially in equipment. Nonetheless, the popular notion that they were completely wiped out is far from the truth. They still remained a potent fighting force. If they would be truly destroyed then the Allies would be in Germany much sooner.